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ABSTRACT 
While wireless ad-hoc networks continue to become more popular, the number of attacks on 
computer systems increases each year. These attacks are common occurrences in both the 
wired and wireless network environments. The wireless ad-hoc environment is susceptible to 
many attacks. Wireless ad-hoc networks are vulnerable to common wireless attacks (e.g. 
jamming) and attacks more specific to the ad-hoc environment (e.g. sleep deprivation 
attacks). 
Encryption and authentication mechanisms alone have never been enough to prevent 
intrusions. Encryption can usually be broken, even if a brute-force attack is required, and 
authentication can easily be defeated (e.g. stealing a password or gaining access to a host 
which is already authenticated). Because of this, a second line of defense is needed. Intrusion 
detection systems have proven to be effective at providing this second line of defense. 
Establishing this second line of defense in a wireless ad-hoc network though brings with it 
many challenges. Such challenges consist of dealing with the ease that hosts enter and leave 
the network at random, of hosts being physically attacked or stolen and the possibility of an 
attacker disrupting the network through data route changes. This thesis aims to research 
agent-based intrusion detection systems and provide the design and implementation of an 
intrusion detection system based on mobile agents in a wireless ad-hoc network. 
Utilizing research from intrusion detection systems, mobile agents and event correlation, we 
design a system for detecting intrusions in wireless ad-hoc networks by means of mobile 
agents. With the design created, we implement our mobile agent intrusion detection system 
using mobile devices set up in a wireless ad-hoc network. The system is then tested against 
three attack scenarios— two real-time, online attacks and one off-line attack 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Data communication networks have become a vital part of today's society. These networks 
transmit phone calls, Internet traffic and banking transactions among other things over long. 
distances. As demand for access to these networks has exploded, a new breed of data 
network has become popular —wireless networks. These wireless networks have quickly 
become the cutting edge technology for schools, universities, businesses and airports. 
Wireless networks introduced a new freedom to its users. Individuals can now access the 
Internet without plugging a cable into their computer; they can leave their previously 
stationary workstations, and now freely move around while continuing to access the network 
through a common access point. 
As wireless networks quickly gained popularity, yet another breed of data network evolved. 
This new type of network is called a wireless ad-hoc network. These ad-hoc networks allow 
individuals to set up private peer-to-peer networks anywhere without the need for traditional 
network infrastructures. 
While wireless ad-hoc networks continue to become more popular, the number of attacks on 
computer systems increases each year. These attacks are common occurrences in both the 
wired and wireless network environments. The wireless ad-hoc environment is susceptible to 
many attacks. Such networks are vulnerable to common wireless attacks (e.g. jamming) and 
attacks more specific to the ad-hoc environment (e.g. sleep deprivation attacks (7]). 
Encryption and authentication mechanisms alone have never been enough to prevent 
intrusions. Encryption can usually be broken, even if a brute-force attack is required, and 
authentication can easily be defeated (e.g. stealing a password or gaining access to a host 
which is already authenticated). Because of this, a second line of defense is needed. Intrusion 
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Establishing this second line of defense in a wireless ad hoc network brings with it many 
challenges. Such challenges consist of dealing with the ease that hosts enter and leave the 
network at random, of hosts being physically attacked or stolen and the possibility of an 
attacker disrupting the network through data route changes, This. thesis aims to research 
agent-based intrusion detection systems and provides the design and implementation of an 
intrusion detection system based on mobile agents in a wireless ad-hoc network. 
1.2 Wireless ad-hoc networks 
Wireless data networks have become cor~lmonplace in such places as airports, schools, 
universities and businesses. As more and more devices become capable of utilizing these 
networks and computing becomes more ubiquitous, a new type of data network is emerging —
the wireless ad-hoc network. A wireless ad-hoc network is any network with a dynamic 
topology and no fixed infrastructure where inter-device cor~nnunication is performed without 
the use of wires. In this thesis, we will concentrate on the network based on the IEEE 802.11 
protocol. Furthermore, by our definition, there is no special hardware required for the 
network to operate. In a typical environment, routers andlor switches are necessary to pass a 
message from one device to another. In the wireless ad-hoc network, this is not necessary. 
Routing in this type of network is performed by the same devices which are sending and 
receiving messages. Consider Figure 1.1. If device A wants to send a message to device D A 
will first send the message to B, then B will send the message to C, and finally C will deliver 
the message to D. 
Wireless ad-hoc networks allow end-user devices to communicate directly with one another, 
forming a communication network anywhere, at any time. A common example of such a 
network is a group of students wishing to share digital information with each other. For 
instance, student A has a laptop and students B, C, and D have PDAs. The four students can 
form an ad-hoc network with each of their devices and run peer-to-peer applications. 
Similarly, these networks could be utilized for city-wide network coverage, vehicle 
communications, sensor networks and space missions. 
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Security concerns are inherent to wireless ad-hoc networks. Because these networks 
communicate wirelessly and have weak encryption standards, they are susceptible to security 
issues such as lack of ability to contain signal propagation, denial of service attacks against 
the communication channel and cryptanalysis attacks. The ad-hoc property adds even further 
concerns such as trust amongst the hosts. 
The ad-hoc environment uses trust relationships between participating devices. When a node 
A, wants to send a message to node D, that message may first have to pass through nodes B 
and C. Nodes A and D both trust B and C not to breech the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of that message. So Band Care-trusted not to tamper with the message, and also 
trusted to pass the message towards D instead of merely holding the message forever or 
dropping it. 
Figure 1.1 Wireless ad-hoc network 
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~.3 Intrusion detection system 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) employs various mechanisms for .finding an "intrusion." 
This intrusion can be defined as any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality, or availability of a resource j 13]. An example of an intrusion would be a 
virus getting onto a home computer and deleting user files. The virus intrusion would have 
compromised the availability of those user files. 
Intrusion detection systems are categorized into two models: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. 'The misuse detection model uses known signatures to identify an intrusion. A 
common use of this model is an antivirus application for a home computer. This antivirus 
application uses signature files to scan the local computer for matching viruses. When a new 
virus becomes known, a new signature file must be installed in order to detect the new virus. 
The problem with the misuse detection model is that it can not detect new attacks without a 
signature. This is not the case with the anomaly detection model. 
The anomaly detection model uses a "trained" normal profile of the system, and identifies 
anything out of the ordinary. A downfall of the anomaly detection model is its susceptibility 
to high false alarm rates. This model is more likely to identify an intrusion when there really 
isn't an intrusion. The reason for these false positives is because the system is constantly 
changing and the anomaly detector is not "learning" these changes quickly enough. For 
instance, if the system is trained on the normal behavior of a particular user and that user 
changes his or her routine one day, the system may see this behavior as an anomaly. 
Everything the user is doing may be perfectly legitimate, but the system is not accustomed to 
this particular change in behavior. 
Intrusion detection systems can collect data in one of two ways —network based or host 
based. Network based data collection means all network traffic which can be "seen" by the 
device is collected. The intrusion detection system analyzes all the traffic on a network 
segment promiscuously. As an example of network based data collection, imagine a person 
standing in a crowded room. Everyone in that room is participating in different 
conversations. Although the room is very noisy, our subject is able to hear everyone's 
conversations and understand what is being said. 
On the other hand, host based data collection only collects network data destined for that 
host. The intrusion detection system in this case analyzes audit logs, system processes and 
network traffic locally. Going back to our example of the noisy room, if our subject is 
practicing host based data collection, he or she can only hear the communication that another 
person is saying directly to him or her. 
Intrusion detection systems are in no way perfect. Cor~nnon shortcomings of these systems 
include [24] 
• Lack of efficiency: 
o IDSs often attempt to process events in real time. In large networks, this is 
difficult to do when using network-based data monitoring, and packets get 
dropped. Regardless of network size, host-based IDSs also tend to slow down 
the system the IDS resides on. 
• High number of false positives: 
o Accurately detecting attacks is very difficult. IDSs often report false alarms 
because of their imperfection -and over-sensitivity to What constitutes an 
lntl'uSlon. 
• Burdensome maintenance: 
o In misuse IDSs, signatures of intrusions are used to determine what is 
considered an intrusion and what is not. Periodically, these signatures need to 
be updated, which may require specific knowledge of how the system works 
to accurately update the system. Likewise, in anomaly detection the system 
must be periodically trained on normal system behavior which could also 
require specific knowledge of the system. 
• Limited f lexibility: 
o IDSs have proved to be difficult to move from one environment to another. 
'This is especially true with a misuse IDS which has been trained for a 
particular environment. Additionally, many IDSs must be restarted to effect 
any changes. 
• Vulnerability to direct attack: 
o Most IDSs utilize a hierarchical structure for the different components. This 
results in a single point of failure further up the hierarchy. An attacker needs 
only to target a node higher in the hierarchy to take down the branch of 
components under that node. 
• Vulnerability to deception: 
o An attacker may use specially crafted packets to fool the IDS. The attacker 
can alter fragmentation, sequence numbers, and packet flags in order to fool 
the IDS . 
• Limited response capability: 
o Most IDSs are more concerned with detecting an intrusion than on preventing 
the intrusion. Typically, an administrator is given the task of responding to the 
intrusion once detected by the IDS. This gives the attacker time to continue 
the attack until the administrator has time to respond. 
Currently, using mobile agents in IDSs does not solve all these shortcomings, but attempts to 
improve on some of these weaknesses. 
1.4 Mobile agents 
A mobile agent is aself-contained program capable of functioning autonomously. This 
program is able to carry out activities in an intelligent manner and is responsive to changes in 
the environment [12]. More simply stated, a mobile agent is a program that moves from host 
to host and performs a task at each host. This task might be statically or dynamically chosen 
for each host. This means the mobile agent may do something different on device A than it 
does on device B. Since a mobile agent is autonomous, the agent decides on its itinerary and 
may suspend its execution at any time and continue at the next destination [9]. 
There are a number of advantages for using mobile agents in an intrusion detection system 
[24] 
• Overcoming network latency: 
o Mobile agents can carry out tasks at the remote host, allowing the agents to 
respond in real time to changes in the environment. 
• Reducing network load: 
o Mobile agents are capable of performing code execution on the same host as 
the data being used for that computation. There is no need to move data across 
the network to the agent. 
• Autonomous and asynchronous execution: 
o If a portion of the system is damaged or lost, the mobile agents can continue 
to function and can repair {e.g. by cloning themselves) the damaged portion if 
necessary. 
• Dynamic adaptation: 
o Agents are capable of adapting to their environment. If an agent is in danger it 
can move to another host, clone itself in case it is destroyed, or ask other 
agents for assistance. 
• Platform independence: 
o Agents can move .from host to host regardless of the hardware or software on 
each host. Agents only require agent platforms and these are available in 
many languages compatible with numerous software platforms. 
Additionally, certain properties of wireless networks also cater to mobile agents. One such 
property is the ease at which the agents can be added to the environment. Since a mobile 
agent is autonomous and does not rely on outside support, a new agent can be injected into a 
network as long as an agent server is available. As new hosts enter into the wireless network, 
minimal effort is needed to integrate those hosts into the system. 
Another favorable property of wireless networks is the lack of persistent connections, as 
required by the agent. In a typical clientlserver paradigm, communication is performed by 
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one host sending a request and then waiting for a response from another host. This 
communication is performed while keeping a connection live between the two hosts. Since 
agents move themselves to different hosts, they need not keep any connection open between 
themselves and another host at all times. 
Agent platforms have been built in a variety of programming languages. Recursion 
Software's Voyager [20] and IBM's Aglets [10] are two agent platforms that are developed 
using Java. Gypsy [4] is a platform written in Java and Python, and Agents for Remote 
Action (Ara) [23] is written in Tcl and C, with plans to port to Java. 
1.5 Contribution 
This thesis focuses on using mobile agents in wireless ad-hoc networks for intrusion 
detection systems. The contributions of this research include: extending MAIDS to the 
wireless ad-hoc environment, implementing mobile agents in the wireless ad-hoc 
environment to detect intrusions, and using the mobile agents to perform event correlation in 
the wireless ad-hoc environment. 
Extension of MAIDS to wireless ad-hoc network 
Mobile agents are capai~le of moving themselves autonomously from host to host and 
executing their code at each of these hosts. We extend the Multi-Agents Intrusion Detection 
System (MAIDS) [9] from the wired environment to the wireless ad-hoc environment and 
develop a mobile agent platform to function in the wireless ad-hoc network for detecting 
intrusions. 
Implementation of mobile agents for wireless ad-hoc networks 
Our system design and implementation demonstrate the viability of using mobile agents for 
intrusion detection in wireless ad-hoc networks. We show how our agent-based IDS can be 
used to alert system administrators of an intrusion through three attack scenarios in a wireless 
ad-hoc network and design agents for each scenario to detect the attacks. 
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Event correlation using mobile agents in wireless ad-hoc networks 
Finally, our research uses mobile agents to perform event correlation in the wireless ad-hoc 
network. Intrusion detection systems often report many low-level alerts, where many of those 
alerts might be false positives, or too many of these low-level alerts may be ignored by the 
system administrator. To obtain a higher level alert and be able to see how that alert was 
generated, some type of correlation is needed. Our research demonstrates how mobile agents 
can be used to correlate events in a wireless ad-hoc network. 
1.6 Roadmap 
Our goal is to extend MAIDS to the wireless ad-hoc network, implement mobile agents in the 
wireless ad-hoc network and use the mobile agents to perform event correlation for detecting 
intrusions in the wireless ad-hoc network. Chapter 2 discusses related work in the areas of 
using mobile agents for intrusion detection systems, intrusion detection in wireless ad-hoc 
networks, and event correlation techniques. Chapter 3 presents our system design and 
implementation used in our research. Chapter 4 discusses the testing of our system through 
three attack scenarios implemented in this study. In Chapter 5, we conclude the thesis with 
discussions on future work. 
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CHAPTER 2: Related Work 
1Vluch work has been done in the areas of using mobile agents for intrusion detection systems, 
intrusion detection systems in wireless ad-hoc networks, and event correlation. An overview 
of those topics is presented here as they pertain to the scope of this research. 
2.1 Mobile agents for IDS 
There have been numerous approaches using mobile agents for intrusion detection [24]. 
While each of these approaches is different, most agree that a hierarchical structure is well-
suited. 
The authors of [13] discuss a framework through a hierarchical approach where multiple 
agents are stationed at each node. This can conceptually be visualized as a tree with leafs 
representing the agents. In this framework, the agents on each host pass messages to the local 
transceiver (machine) that further pass information to a monitoring station (root node). This 
approach allows the intrusion detection computation to be performed at any node in the tree 
where enough information is collected. 
The intrusion detection agent (IDA) system [ 14] uses mobile agents to trace intruders 
through a variety of hosts. This system is composed of a manager component to analyze 
information gathered by the agents, sensor components on each host to monitor system logs 
for marks left by a suspected intruder {MLSI), tracing agent components which are 
dispatched by the manager component to trace the path of an intrusion until the agent finds 
the origin of the attack, information-gathering agent components which are activated by the 
tracing agent to return information related to the MLSIs back to the manager, and finally 
bulletin and message board components which serve as a common area to exchange 
information between the agents and between the agents and the manager. This system is set 
up in a hierarchical structure with the manager at the root and the agents at the leaves. 
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In a dynamic network, nodes are likely to come and go. Any statically-defined hierarchical 
approach is likely to fail when a node higher up the tier leaves the network. One solution to 
this problem is to become less reliant on the hierarchy. Using mobile agents in a fully 
decentralized manner places less emphasis on a hierarchical design and more on agent 
mobility [2] . 'The approach taken in [~] only requires each participating device to have an 
-agent platform and sensor support in order for the intrusion detection system to function. The 
agent then roams the network looking for suspicious activity. Once that activity has been 
detected, the agent sends child agents to interrogate other hosts before returning to the parent 
agent to share the gathered information. 
In order to reduce the amount of intrusion detection processing performed by any one node, 
[ 17] proposes a framework where different hosts may have different responsibilities while 
participating in the intrusion detection system. This approach still uses a hierarchical design 
with multiple agents per host, where the agents form a hierarchy in order to distribute the 
workload of the IDS. The difference is in how much information each host is accountable for 
processing. Chosen by an election process, certain nodes monitor the network traffic 
promiscuously, while other nodes monitor only local traffic. The idea behind this approach is 
to have a detection agent on each node monitor items such as CPU activity, I/O activity, and 
user operations for anything unusual [ 16] . The local agent can terminate the suspicious 
process if necessary. If an inconclusive event is detected, the agent gathers data from an 
elected nearby neighbor agent to determine the appropriate action. 
A more robust framework was sought after in [3 ] .This scheme demonstrated how agents 
could operate independently and cooperatively while organizing an IDS with no single point 
of failure. This approach does not use a single repository for the data collected and the alert 
notifications, but rather the mobile agents use other mobile agents as data repositories. Since 
each agent contains knowledge about the detected events and each agent is capable of 
performing all IDS functions, an attacker must disable each agent in order to stop the IDS. If 
an attacker only destroys a few of the agents, the remaining agents continue to carry out the 
functions of the IDS and can eventually rebuild the destroyed agents. 
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Following in the hierarchical framework design and using both stationary and mobile agents, 
[9] outlines amulti-tiered design where mobile agents travel between systems gathering data 
from localized agents then correlate that information and return the result to the system 
administrator. This system is built upon a hierarchy of agents with different tasks. As data is 
gathered and cleansed by the lower level agents, the data is passed further up the hierarchy 
with the user interface at the top. The user interface allows alerts to be displayed to an 
administrator and also for new agents and hosts to be dynamically added to the IDS. 
2.21DS in wireless ad-hoc networks 
Mobile ad-hoc networks provide a unique environment for intrusion detection systems. This 
distinctiveness demands new intrusion detection methods to be found for such an 
environment. 
one such proposed method involves a hybrid intrusion detection system composed from four 
different intrusion detection techniques [6]. These authors attempt to use statistical anomaly 
detection algorithms, mobile agents, peer-to-peer data sharing techniques from Inds [ 19], 
and data-mining algorithms to create a scalable framework for both wired and wireless 
networks. This is a very ambitious approach and the system has not been implemented. 
according to Zhang and Lee [25], new techniques are needed to make intrusion detection 
more effective in the wireless environment. They suggest an IDS architecture be distributed 
and cooperative among all nodes and should use a statistical approach for anomaly detection. 
The key idea is to have each node monitor local trace data for intrusions at each networking 
layer. If a node detects anomalous activity, that node will begin a cooperative verification 
through the combination of neighbors' trace data. Zhang et al. implemented this approach in 
ad-hoc routing protocols using a wireless network simulator package, Network Simulator 
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ns-2 [26]. Ripper and SVM Light were used to compute classifiers for use as anomaly 
detectors. Simulations showed the detectors had good detection performance, with the best 
performance from on-demand routing protocols. 
2.3 Event correlation 
An intrusion attempt discovered on one device may be a part of a larger attack. Event 
correlation attempts to discover these larger attacks by chaining together related attacks in 
hopes of finding a causal relationship of an attack that otherwise would not have been 
discovered. 
A detection scheme to relate events that occur at different hosts can be used to detect 
distributed signatures and anomalies. Such a scheme was proposed that looks for patterns by 
sending messages between sensors running on different nodes [ 1 ~ . Pattern matching is then 
used to trigger alerts while each node only makes local decisions based on those alerts. These 
patterns are described in a pattern description language where a pattern definition consists of 
an attack scenario name, a node identifier, and a pattern (list of events). when a set of events 
match the criteria for a scenario, an alert is raised. This scheme functions without the use of a 
central coordination unit, although a centralized server is used to push updated attack 
signature databases to~ the remote sensors. 
Mobile agents are also used to correlate events in dynamic networks [2] . The tracing of 
chained telnet sessions is performed by an agent using helper agents that are deployed to 
gather further data and then return to the parent agent to share results for correlation. In this 
design, each device in the network only needs to have an agent platform available to 
participate. One node runs the management console which keeps track of participating hosts 
in the network, allows users to specify queries before launching an agent and also configures 
remote sensors. When a query is made, an agent is sent from the management console to look 
for certain patterns. Once the agent has finished carrying out its task, it returns to the 
management console to report its findings. 
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Another model for event correlation uses pre-conditions and post-conditions to link events 
[18]. The pre-condition of an intrusion is the necessary condition for the intrusion to be 
successful. Even though it is a condition for the intrusion to be successful, it does not need to 
match an attack itself. The pre-condition could be as simple as the existence of a vulnerable 
service without the attacker ever actively discovering the vulnerability. The post-condition of 
an intrusion is a possible outcome state assuming the intrusion was successful. There can be 
many possible post-conditions for a single intrusion. For example, if an intrusion successfully 
installs back orifice on a system, two possible post-conditions are that system can be 
vulnerable to a denial of service, or can be used as a file server. As alerts are generated by an 
IDS, these alerts are compared against the rules in a database to determine if a correlation can 
be made. If a correlation is made, ahyper-alert is generated to represent the alerts involved. 
The rules for defining the pre-conditions, post-conditions and hyper-alerts must be previously 
defined and the system can only detect correlated alerts which match those rules. This 
framework was evaluated using the 2000 DARPA intrusion detection scenario datasets and 
showed a high percentage of correlating all related alerts in the datasets. One such correlation 
from that dataset consisted of an attack with five phases. Phase one was a Sadmind Wing 
where the attacker found a vulnerable service. The second phase was a buffer overflow attack 
called Sadmind Amslveri, fy_Overflow. This was followed by Rsh alerts when the attacker 
installed daemon and master programs. The fourth phase involved alerts caused by the 
daemon and master programs communicating. Finally, the fifth phase was a distributed 
denial of service attack. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have provided the necessary background on intrusion detection systems in 
wireless ad-hoc networks, event correlation and other work that is related to our research 
using mobile agents for intrusion detection. Based on the concepts introduced here, the 
system design and implementation used in our research will be presented in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: System Design and Implementation 
This chapter details the system architecture and algorithm used in this research. Also 
included in this chapter is our implementation of the system design. Common ad-hoc devices 
include cellular telephones, laptop computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs). Other 
devices such as desktop computers can also be used to form an ad-hoc network. For the 
scope of this paper, all devices used in the ad-hoc network will be assumed to be mobile 
ev~ces. 
3.1 System design 
The software employed in our research can be visualized as consisting of multiple layers, 
each layer building on the previous layer. Figure 3.1 illustrates these layers. 
Mobile Agents for Detecting Intrusions 
Mobile Agent IDS 
Mobile Agent Platform 
Java virtual Machine 
Operating System 
Figure 3.1 Software layer design 
~~ 
~ Mobile Agents for Detecting Intrusions; 
o Mobile agents make up the top layer of our design. This layer consists of 
single or multiple agents. These agents carry out any task (e.g. detecting 
intrusions) they are programmed to perform. 
• Mobile Agent IDS: 
o The fourth layer manages the mobile agents and consists of -the intrusion 
detection system. This layer can be anything from an administrator console to 
display agent messages, to a simple application to launch agents into a 
network. 
• Mobile Agent Platform: 
o The third layer makes up the agent platform. Such platforms can be written in 
different programming languages such as Java (e.g. Recursion's Voyager and 
IBM's Aglets), Python (e.g. Gypsy) and Tcl (e.g. Ara). 
• Java Virtual Machine: 
o The second layer consists of a Java virtual machine. This layer is needed when 
the higher layers are written in Java, and an interpreter is needed. This layer 
could be replaced with something other than a JVM if another programming 
language, such as Python or Tcl, is used in the Mobile Agent Platform layer. 
• Operating System: 
o The bottom layer consists of the operating system. This layer can be any 
operating system such as Linux or Microsoft Windows since the next layer up 
consists of a virtual machine. 
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3.2 Algorithm development for mobile agents 
Mobile agents make up the top layer of our system design. For each of the attack scenarios 
described in Chapter 4, a new agent is created to detect the attack. Figure 3.2 shows the 
algorithm used to create the software agent. This algorithm provided the basic structure of 
the agents and supplied a modular approach for adding new features to the agents. 
1. Process Snort log for subset of alerts (as defined as rules in agent code) 
2. Store those alerts which are related to intrusion 
3. Look for correlations from stored events 
If (correlations found) 
Store those correlations 
Raise alert level 
4. Move to next host 
Figure 3.2 Mobile agent algorithm 
The first thing the .agent does when arriving at a new host is to read alerts from the Snort log 
file. This is performed in the agent code (see Appendix B) in the function check4intrusiorts{~. 
Once an individual alert from the log is read in, the alert is compared against rules to 
determine if a hyper-alert can be created. These hyper-alerts store detailed information about 
the alert such as date, source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, and time. Each 
alert read from the log file can generate a single hyper-alert if the alert name from the log file 
is the same as an alert defined in the rules. The hyper-alerts are stored in a table for future 
correlating. 
The subset of alerts mentioned in Figure 3.2 is defined as rules in the agent code, as shown in 
Figure 3.3 [5]. These rules specify the pre-conditions and post-conditions for alerts. Figure 
3.3 shows pseudo-code of how this is done in our agent that is used in our first test scenario. 
The alerts which are related to an intrusion are stored in a table as hyper-alerts. The hyper-
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alerts are then correlated and stored in the table CorrelatedAlert. This table is set up as 
shown in Figure 3.4. The variable id stores the counter for keeping track of how many 
correlations are in the table. For example, the first alert inserted in the table would have an id 
of i, the second an id of 2, etc. The variable Cause stores integer representation of the pre-
condition for the correlated alert, and Result stores the integer representation of the post-
condition for the alert. The Events variable stores the string representation of the correlated 
alert for displaying the alert to the administrator. An example of the Events variable would be 
67286 ~ 6746 where these numerical values represent the Snort alert identifier. 
Before the agent moves to another host, the new alerts in the correlation table are compared 
against other alerts in the table for matching values. This correlation is performed in the 
function InsertCorrTable{) shown in the agent code presented in Appendix B. For example, 
if the table has an existing alert with the Events set to 67286 ~ 67416 and a new alert is 
ready to be inserted into the table with the new Events being 67416 ~ 67540, the values are 
compared. If apre-condition of either matches apost-condition of the other, the preexisting 
Events is modified to reflect this. Using our example values, the new Events will be 
appended to the old, resulting in 67286 ~ 67416-~ 67540. The resulting Events pre-
condition becomes 67286 and the post-condition becomes 67540. This newly created alert is 
then inserted into the end of the table, and further comparisons are done on the remaining 
alerts in the table. Once the end of the table has been reached, the new alert with Events-
67416 -~ 67540 is finally inserted into the table. 
After the local log files have been processed, as mentioned above, the agent is ready to move 
to another host. To move to another host, the agent chooses a new destination from a list of 
known hosts with available agent servers running. This list is assigned to the agent before the 
agent is released into the network, and the agent can choose from the list randomly or 
according to a certain itinerary. Once the agent has chosen a new destination, the agent server 
serializes the agent and the agent data. The server then transfers the serialized data to the 
destination agent server. The receiving agent server deserializes the agent and its data, and 
begins execution of a callback function. This transition from a host to the destination host is 
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initiated by the function call shown in Figure 3.5.Once the moveTo method has been called, 
Voyager will automatically perform this serializing, transfer of data, and deserializing, along 
with execution of the callback function. The function newHost. dest() returns the IP address 
of the destination host. "1Vlainloop" is the callback function used in Voyager's moveTo 
method. This "mainloop" function will begin executing once the agent arrives at the 
destination host. The agent code for this example is included in Appendix B, along with the 
callback function in Appendix C. 
While (not end of log file) 
{ 
Input Events from Snort log file; 
If (Event Name matches rule) 
{ Create hyper-alert; 
Store hyper-alert in ConsegSet and PreregSet tables; 
} 
} 
Create correlated alert; 
Store new alert in CorrelationTable; 
Move to new host; 
public void MyRules() 
{ 
Rule =new RuleSet[6]; 
Rule~O]= new RuleSet("Sadmind_Ping", "OSSolaris", 0 ,"VulnerableSadmind" ,0); 
Rule[ 1 ]= new RuleSet("Sadmind_Amslverify_Overflow", "VulnerableSadmind", 
"OSSolaris", 1, "GainAccess", 0); 
Rule[2]= new RuleSet("Rsh", "GainAccess", "GainAccess", 2, "SystemComprornised", 
"SystemCompromised", 2); 
Rule[3]= new RuleSet("Mstream Zombie", "SystemCompromised", 
"SystemCompromised", 2, "ReadyToLaunchDDOSAttack", -1); 
Rulej4]= new RuleSet("Stream DoS", "ReadyToLaunchDDOSAttack", - 1, "DDOSAgainst", 0); 
Figure 3.3 Correlation rules 
class CorrelationTable implements Serializable 
{ 
int id; 
int Cause; 
int Result; 
String Events; 
} 
Figure 3.4 Correlation Table 
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Agent.of(this).moveTo{newHost.destQ, "mainioop"); 
Figure 3,5 Agent transition 
3.3 MAIDS system architecture 
Figure 3.fi shows the MAIDS system architecture. This architecture is composed of several 
layers with multiple agents at each layer. 
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Figure 3.6 MAIDS system architecture [9J 
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Making up the bottom layer, stationary agents, known as data cleaning agents, gather 
information from system logs and audit data. These agents then arrange the information into 
a common format to be used by the next higher layer. 
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The middle layer of the MAIDS architecture is built from low-level agents. These mobile 
agents monitor and classify activities and events as they visit each of their associated data 
cleaning agents. The information at this layer is shared with other agents in the same layer 
and is also passed further up the hierarchy. 
The top layer of the architecture in Figure 3.6 contains the user interface and data mining and 
fusion agents. These are the high-level agents. The data fusion and data mining agents collect 
data from lower level agents and mine knowledge from the database. The database stores 
information for use by the agents and for off-line training purposes. 
The hierarchical architecture for this IDS agent system has the following advantages [9]: 
1. The implementation of agents is efficient. Since low-level agents travel to monitored 
systems, mediator parts need not to travel. Many low-level agents are generated and 
migrating to monitored systems, so the mediator part does not need to be generated 
multiple times and does not need to migrate. This saves much network bandwidth and 
CPU time. 
2. The layered system is easy to design and modify. A clear organization of the agents 
makes the system easy to maintain. 
3. It provides platform independence. The lower levels that need to have contact with 
system logs are platform dependent. When a new operating system is added, only the 
lowest level agents (data collecting agents) need to be added. 
3.4 System implementation 
The system consists of numerous mobile devices as hosts. The hosts are all members of a 
wireless ad-hoc network. Each node in the system runs an agent server and includes the 
l~~IAIDS software. Certain nodes also run Snort [22] as a local intrusion detection system. A 
more detailed look at the system is discussed in the following sections. 
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Hardware 
The handheld devices in this research are the Sharp Zaurus SL-5500 [21] with a 
CompactFlash 802.11 Ethernet card. For the wireless card to work in ad-hoc mode, a new 
Linux kernel with wireless extensions enabled is required [11]. 
The other hardware is standard laptop computers running Microsoft Windows operating 
system. These computers have built-in 802.11 Ethernet cards. 
With the PDAs acting like handheld Linux computers and communicating wirelessly with the 
laptops, the next step is to get the MAIDS software working on the devices. 
Software 
The software in our research is implemented in a layered approach (see Figure 3.1). The 
intrusion detection agents are implemented in the top layer. The next layer down is composed 
of the MAIDS software. 
The MAIDS project is written entirely in Java making it compatible on many platforms. 
Employing lightweight agents, MAIDS is built upon a hierarchy of agents with different 
tasks. As data is gathered and cleansed by the lower level agents, the data is passed further up 
the hierarchy with the user interface at the top. The user interface allows alerts to be 
displayed to an administrator and also for new agents and hosts to be dynamically added to 
the IDS. The design of MAIDS is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
For agent mobility, MAIDS utilizes the Voyager Object Request Broker [20]. This agent 
platform supporting MAIDS consists of Voyager modules. This project takes advantage of 
many features from voyager version 3.2. Both l~2AIDS and voyager are written entirely in 
Java, so layer two of our design consists of Java Virtual Machine version 1.4.0 on the 
Windows laptops, and JVM 1.1 on the PDAs. Figure 3.5 summarizes the hardware and 
software that is used in this research. 
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Recursion's Voyager is chosen as the agent platform for our research because it has already 
been established as a working agent platform for MAIDS for the wired network in our 
previous project, is written entirely in Java, is a commonly used mobile agent platform, and 
has technical support available through Recursion Software, Inc. This platform provides the 
following useful functions for the agents in the IDS [9] 
• Mobility: 
o The Voyager ORB provides agent mobility from host to host. Any serializable 
object can easily be moved between Voyager servers. In the case of mobile 
agents, the agents continue executing after arriving at the new destination. 
• Interfacing: 
o Voyager provides a means for dynamic aggregation of objects. This allows 
objects to be easily upgraded with new code and data at runtime, allowing the 
agents to remain lightweight as they traverse the network and then being 
updated with new services when necessary. 
• Naming services: 
o The naming service allows access to many naming services {e.g. CORBA, 
RMI) through a single API. It also allows easy binding of objects. 
Voyager is also written entirely in Java and thus supports a broader platform for simple code 
migration. Furthermore, Voyager makes available many modules that are beneficial for 
future research, including: 
• Messaging: 
o Voyager provides an API for sending messages to an object regardless of the 
object type or location. This can be used to ease development of inter-agent 
communication within an IDS. 
• security: 
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o This module provides a method for implementing SSL communication 
amongst objects. Additionally, agents can utilize this module to allow them to 
tunnel through firewalls. 
• Transactions: 
o Using atwo-phase commit, this module ensures distributed transactions are 
properly tenlunated. This could be used for research concerning critical 
decision making among agents in the IDS. 
MAIDS 
Voyager ORB 3.2 
Sun's JVM 1.4.0 
Windows XP OS 
MAIDS 
Voyager ORB 3.2 
JVM 1.1 
LINEO Embedix OS 
Figure 3.7 Hardware and software of laptop and palmtop 
Extending MAIDS 
A major problem encountered in extending MAIDS to the wireless ad-hoc environment had 
to do with agent mobility. The agent was unsuccessful, in the beginning of this research, at 
moving between physical machines. The agent would move between various servers hosted 
on the same machine (each server running on a different port), but the agent would not move 
when the destination server was on a different physical machine. After much trial and error in 
a wired network setup, it was discovered the MAIDS agents ran into problems when moving 
from host to host if the hosts were running different versions of Java Virtual Machines 
(JVMs). 
The JVM compatibility problem was an important one. The PDAs run JVM version 1.1, and 
the other devices had various versions of the JVM installed. LJitimately, many versions of the 
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Java platform were tested including versions 1.3.1, 1.4.0 and 1.4.2. in our research, only 
version 1.4.0 was compatible with the Jv~l1/I on the PDAs. Using this version of the JVM 
allowed the agents to move from host to host without any problems. 
Finally, it was discovered that when compiling the l~~IAIDS source code for the PDAs, the 
" target ~.1 "flag needed to be set as a compile option or else the code would not work 
properly. Once all the j ava problems had been overcome, there was still a problem with the 
Voyager servers. 
_ In order for the .agents to move from host to host, each destination host must be running a 
Voyager server. This server opens a system port for the agent to use during transitions, and 
also interprets the serialized agent data. A problem was discovered during this research 
between the Voyager server and the version of Jv~/I on the PDAs. Voyager ORB versions 
4.~, 4.6, 4.5 and 3.2 were tested on the PDAs. Version 3.2 was the only version that was 
successful in our research. The other versions of the ORB had a function that was making a 
call to the Vector.add{) method, which is an invalid method in JVM 1.1. 
With l~~IAIDS functioning in the ad-hoc environment, the next phase of this project was to 
extend the application to detect attacks in this environment. The original design of MAIDS 
was tested with the FTP bounce attack [9] . To further add other attacks to which the MAIDS 
software system can detect, new agents and attack scenarios are needed. 
3.51mplications 
In amixed-architecture environment, there is a high probability of having software on certain 
hosts and not others. There is also a high probability of having similar software on multiple 
hosts, but with different versions of that software. Generally, software is assumed to be 
backward compatible with older versions. Our experience in this research has taught us that 
not all J~i~1VIs are compatible with one another. Having found software that is compatible with 
our system as a whole, we now have a working mobile agent IDS for our mixed architecture. 
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Whether the environment is wired, wireless or a mix of both, our system configuration will 
allow our mobile agents to visit the Linux-based PDAs and the Windows-based laptops. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the software and hardware configurations used, along with our system 
design and implementation. Also shown here are the MAIDS system architecture and the 
organization of the software layers. Using the agent algorithm and system implementation 
introduced here, Chapter 4 details the testing of the system through three attack scenarios that 
are implemented in this research and detected using mobile agents. 
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CHAPTER 4: System Testing 
Using the system design and implementation described in Chapter 3, this chapter illustrates .-
three attack scenarios and testing that is done for this research. These attack scenarios were 
implemented —two real-time, online attacks and one off-line attack, and are below. 
4.1 Attack scenarios 
Scenario 1: Stream Denial of Service tDOS) 
The first attack scenario that was run in the wireless ad-hoc environment is an off-line attack. 
This scenario is aimed at making sure the agent can gather data at multiple hosts and then 
correlate that data to find intrusions. The technique for this off-line attack detection is 
adapted from [ 18]. This technique uses pre-conditions and post-conditions to link events. As 
alerts are generated by an IDS, these alerts are compared against rules in a database to 
determine if a correlation can be made. If a correlation is made, ahyper-alert is generated to 
represent the alerts involved. The test data is taken from that in [ 18], and the data file is 
divided into multiple pieces. The data file is divided by extracting arbitrary lines of data from 
the original file and copying these lines into new files. This is done in such a way that each 
new file is similar in length, and no two of these new files has data from the same line of data 
in the original file. The new files are then placed on different hosts in the network. An .agent 
is created to visit each node in the wireless ad-hoc network, collect the alert data from these 
newly created files, and attempt to link events using pre-conditions and post-conditions. The 
rules used for determining whether a correlation exists or not are programed into the agent 
code instead of using a database for .the agent to interact with. As this is an off-line attack, the 
agent is programmed to report all correlated events back to the console after it has gathered 
the data from all hosts. The console application from 1VIAIDS is then modified to display the 
results correlated by the agent. Figure 4.1 shows an example output of the correlated results 
on the console. The top line shows the event identifier and the bottom line shows the name of 
the event. 
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67286 ~ 67416 -~ 67540-~ 67767 ~ 67773 
Sadmind_Ping -~ Sadmind_Amslverify_Overflow ~ Rsh -~ Mstream_Zombie ~ Stream_Dos 
Figure 4.1 Correlated events 
Executing the attack: 
Since this is an off-line attack, the attack has already been carried out. The attack the agent 
will be monitoring is a denial of service attack. The original data for this scenario is from the 
2000 D~►RPA intrusion detection scenario dataset LLDOS 1.0. This dataset contains multiple 
attacks in which an attacker probes hosts, breaks into those hosts, installs software, and 
finally launches a distributed denial of service attack against a further target. 
Detecting the attack: 
The actual attack in this scenario has been previously detected by an IDS. That IDS in turn 
created the alerts in the original dataset. The goal of this scenario is not to detect the attack 
(that's already been done by the IDS), but instead to correlated the alerts generated by the 
IDS. This will provide ahigh-level representation of the alerts to reveal their causal 
relationships. 
Correlating the attack: 
This agent correlates the events of this attack in a decentralized fashion. Using pre-condition 
and post-condition rules (stored in arrays in the agent code) to link events, the events 
collected by the agent on each host are. compared against the rules to determine if a 
correlation can be made. If a correlation is made, ahyper-alert .is generated to represent the 
alerts involved. For example, let's assume event A is apre-condition to event B, and event B 
is apre-condition to event C. Let's further assume apost-condition of event C is a 
compromised system. The agent visits Hostl and reads the events from the data file (placed 
there earlier in the scenario, but could theoretically be dynamically updating in real-time). 
The agent discovers events A and B have both occurred on this host, checks those two events 
against the rules it knows of, and determines ahyper-alert should be created to link these two 
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events together. The agent stores this hyper-alert in its memory, looks for further correlations 
on the current host in the same manner, and then moves to Host2. The agent compares the 
events on Host2 with all other events on Host2 against the rules, generating hyper-alerts as 
necessary. The agent then compares the events on Host2 and the hyper-alerts in memory 
against the rules, creating "higher" hyper-alerts if the rules find a match between events. 
After that has finished, the agent moves to Host3 to perform the same task. At Host3, the 
agent finds event C and creates a "higher" hyper-alert with A, B and C. After the agent has 
visited all hosts in this network, the agent is programmed to write all hyper-alerts to the 
console machine {Figure 4.1) for analysis by an administrator. 
Scenario 2: Nmap Scan 
The second attack is a distributed Nmap [8] scan. Nmap is a program that is capable of 
scanning large networks in order to determine which hosts. are up and what services are 
available on those hosts. An Nmap scan can be considered as an attack because it is one of 
the likely first steps an attacker uses in carrying out an intrusion. This type of scan is 
considered an attack at numerous universities and goes against their security policies. As 
such, hosts suspected of executing these scans are often disconnected from the network. 
In this scenario, the agent travels between three hosts. The attacker, on a fourth machine, 
performed a randomized port scan on the other two hosts. Figure 4.2 illustrates this scenario. 
The job of the agent is to detect what appeared to be completely random (and few in number) 
port activity on each host, and correlate the aggregated results to decide if an Nmap port scan 
is being_ carried out on the ad-hoc network. 
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Attacker 
tickets 
Host A Host B Host C 
Time Port (A) Port (B) Port (C) 
1 21 
2 23 
3 135 
4 80 
5 60 
6 21 
7 85 
8 22 
9 88 
10 60 
11 80 
Figure 4.2 Nmap port scan 
Executing the attack: 
The attacker executes an Nmap port scan on the network. In this case, the attacker is trying to 
do this undetected. The attacker uses a SYN scan so systems are not completing handshakes 
and connecting to one another. This type of a scan works by sending a SYN packet from the 
attacker and waiting for an ACK packet to be received. The attacker then sends back a RST 
packet to close the connection. If a RST packet is received from the target instead of the 
ACK packet, then the attacker knows this port is not active and can not be used in a later 
intrusion attempt. To further reduce the chance of being detected, the attacker can scan the 
target machines at random time intervals and using pseudo-random port numbers while also 
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randomizing the hosts. This could be done by simply using the --scan delay and --
randomi.ze_hosts flags with Nmap. For this particular scenario, system ports twenty through 
one hundred fifty were scanned. 
Detecting the attack: 
Each host in the network is running an IDS. For this experiment, that IDS is Snort. Snort 
detects the SYN packets from the attacker and generates an alert for the targeted packet. The 
mobile agent in this scenario is continuously visiting each of the hosts, one-by-one. As the 
agent is visiting a host, the agent reads alerts generated by Snort. If multiple Snort alerts are 
found by the agent on a host with each alert coming from the same source (i.e. the attacker), 
this agent remembers the port numbers and source address from those alerts. The agent 
continues to visit other nodes. 
Correlating the attack: 
If the agent finds similar alert patterns on the hosts (A, B, C) with the same source address as 
had been seen before, the agent correlates the events. If enough of these particular events are 
correlated, the agent takes a predefined action. In the case of this scenario, once one hundred 
unique ports have been discovered coming from the same host, the agent raises .its alert level 
and prints a message to the screen of each host it visits in order to alert users of the scan. For 
each additional one hundred unique port scans found, the agent will raise the alert level again 
until the alert state is at red. The levels, from less severe to most severe, are: Green, Low 
fellow, Medium fellow, High fellow, Red. 
Scenario 3: Distributed real-time attack 
The third and final attack demonstrated a distributed attack resulting in a system being 
compromised. Figure 4.3 shows the various hosts in this attack. Host Ao is the attacking 
machine. To is the target for the attack. Co and C~ are nodes which have been compromised 
by Ao and will be used to carry out the attack on To. 
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i 
Agent Network 
Figure 4.3 Attack environment 
Executing the attack: 
The first step in this attack is for the attacker, Ao, to gain access to Co and C1. The attacker 
then performs a port scan from Co on the target machine. Following the port scan, the 
attacker attempts to obtain information about the services running on the open ports of the 
target. Once the attacker has this information, she launches a more intrusive attack from C1
against the target. The intrusive attack in this scenario is the Nachi [15] worm infecting the 
target. This worm first sends an ICMP ping to the victim machine to see if the victim is 
listening. If a reply is received, the worm attempts to propagate. This is done by opening a 
remote shell on the victim and instructing the victim to download the worm from the attacker 
via TFTP. Once the download is completed, the code begins executing on the victim. Once 
code execution begins, this worm attempts to download a Microsoft patch to prevent other 
programs similar to it from infecting the victim in the same way. The worm then begins more 
attempts to propagate. This worm is considered more of a nuisance than a malicious worm. 
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The primary downside of this worm is the large volumes of iCMP traffic sent over the 
network. Other variants of this worm are more damaging to computer systems and can be 
used to test our system. 
Detecting the attack: 
While the attack is being carried out, an agent is moving among a number of hosts, including 
the target host, To. Each host the agent visited is locally running the intrusion detection 
system, Snort. Similar to Scenario 2, the agent is reading the log riles produced by Snort at 
each host. The agent also uses the same method as in Scenario 2 to detect the port scan. As 
the agent is moving from host to host, it is carrying with it a signature for the Nachi worm. 
This signature is a pattern in the log file that will be produced by Snort upon detecting traffic 
from the worm. When the agent sees this pattern in the log file, it will remember that data as 
it continues to travel the network. 
Correlating the attack: 
The agent in this scenario is looking for three things: a port scan, a machine trying to obtain 
banner information from a service, and the virus signature. When the agent detects a machine 
trying to obtain banner information from a local service of the current host, the agent cheeks 
the port of the service against previously scanned ports. If the port which the local service is T ~ ~ . . 
running on is a port that had been previously scanned, the agent correlates those two events 
together. When the worm is detected in the Snort logs, the port targeted by the worm is also 
checked against previously scanned ports. If there is a match, the events are correlated. The 
worm port is also check against previous banner information port attempts. If a match is 
found, those events are also correlated. Once the worm has been detected, the agent raises its 
alert level status to red and prints the alert, along with the correlated events, to the screen of 
each host. As each correlation is made between these particular events, the alert level status 
is raised by one level. The levels, from less severe to most severe, are: Green, Low fellow, 
High Yellow, Red. 
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4,2 Implications 
These attack scenarios show, through implementation, mobile. agents can be used to detect 
intrusions in a wireless ad-hoc environment. We also see that the agents can distribute the 
IDS to take place on each host in order to collect data from the whole network. 
In the wireless ad-hoc environment, there is no data concentration point. Implementing an 
IDS on a host in the network will not guarantee any intrusion detection for other parts of that 
network. Using mobile agents allows us to take the IDS to each host in the network to collect 
data instead of needing a data concentration point for data collection. Much research has 
suggested IDSs be distributed for the wireless environment. Our tests show mobile agents 
can be used to accomplish this distribution and collect data network-wide. 
Using the event correlation in the wireless ad-hoc network allows the IDS to discover 
network-wide events along with same-host events. The mobile agents compliment this task 
by being able to visit the host in the network and collect events. An unfavorable property of 
using the mobile agents for event correlation though is the more events an agent correlates, 
the more data that agent has to move through the network each time the agent visits -anew 
host. We did not run into issues with this in our research, but it is feasible for the agent to 
have slow ..transition times between hosts as the amount of data collected increases. :..,: . ~~ 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter shows three attack scenarios that are implemented in this research. We see the 
agent detect Nmap scans, a virus propagating and see the agent, correlate events. The next 
chapter gives the summary of this research along with future work that can be done in the 
area of using mobile agents for intrusion detection. 
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
The objectives of this paper were to develop an agent-based intrusion detection system and 
provide an implementation for using mobile agents for intrusion detection in a wireless ad-
hoc network. 
We have provided copious examples of agent-based intrusion detection systems. These 
systems ranged from hierarchical approaches to flat schemes. They also differed in using 
multiple agents in the network to using a single agent. 
With an understanding of what has already been done in the area of agents and intrusion 
detection, our research is able to design a mobile agent to detect multiple attacks in the 
wireless ad-hoc environment. Armed with the capability to detect intrusions, our agent is able 
to correlate events to give an administrator a higher level view of those attacks. Our 
implementation demonstrates the viability of using mobile agents for intrusion detection in 
wireless ad-hoc networks. 
Through this research, i.t hay been shown that mobile agents are well suited for assisting 
intrusion detection systems in the wireless ad-hoc environment. As the hosts in an ad-hoc 
network move and the environment changes, mobile agents are capable of moving also; 
repositioning themselves to gain an advantage. The agents are also able to move from host to 
host autonomously making it difficult for an attacker to target a specific agent. And because 
agents are autonomous and are _capable of cloning themselves, they can continue to function 
and even rebuild the system when parts are either under attack or destroyed. Lastly, agents 
are capable of moving directly to a source of information for analysis instead of having to 
move the data to the agent. This is very beneficial given the limited network bandwidth in 
wireless ad-hoc networks. 
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5.2 Future work 
The area of intrusion detection has been studied for quite some time, and has even recently 
been studied in wireless networks. Looking at these systems from an ad-hoc environment 
poses new challenges and raises new areas of research. 
One such area of future research is how to manage agents in an ad-hoc network. One agent 
alone can not be expected to monitor hundreds of hosts in a real-time system environment. 
Research needs to be done on how to dynamically create and allocate agents efficiently. 
Once the agent is created, there needs to be an effective method of assigning hosts for that 
agent so the agent can minimize the number of hops needed to visit the hosts. Likewise, a 
schema to allow efficient communication and data sharing amongst these agents needs to be 
studied. 
Other work should focus on a framework of how to handle the different scenarios that may 
happen with hosts in the ad-hoc environment. Since the hosts are constantly moving, entering 
and leaving the network, how should the mobile agents respond? Also included in that 
framework should be criteria for handling the case where an agent is "carried off 'the 
network by a host. 
Finally, research should be conducted on creating a smart agent with machine-learning 
anomaly intrusion detection capability for the ad-hoc environment. This would allow a quick 
deployment of these agents into a previously unknown network. 
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APPENDIX A: Related Work Chart 
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Agents 
~ of agents in 
an N-node 
network 
Event 
correlation Implemented ~ 
Wireless Mobile 
Ad-hoc 
compatibility 
An Architecture for Intrusion 
~DetectlOn using Autonomous 
Agents j 13] 
Y N > N Y P N 
Autonomous agents for 
distributed intrusion detection 
in a multi-host environment 
j3] 
N y > N Y J N 
Flexible, Mobile Agent Based 
Intrusion Detection for 
_Dynamic Networks j2] 
N Y < N Y J, D N 
Intrusion Detection Using 
Mobile Agents in Wireless Ad 
Hoc Networks j 17] 
Y Y > N N N Y 
Lightweight Agents for 
Intrusion Detection j9] 
Y Y < N Y J N 
Intrusion Detection in 
Wireless Ad-Hoc networks j6] 
Y Y > N Y N Y 
Intrusion Detection 
Techniques for Mobile 
Wireless Networks j26] 
Y Y > N N NS-2 Y 
Decentralized Event 
Correlation for Intrusion 
Detection j i ] 
N N N/A Y J, D N 
Constructing attack scenarios 
through correlation of 
intrusion alerts j 18] 
N N N/A Y O, D N 
A Method of Tracing Intruders 
By Use of Mobile Agents [ 14] N 
y < N N P, D N 
Our Approach Y Y < N Y J Y 
Y =yes 
N = no 
> N =greater than N agents required 
< N =less than N agents needed 
N/A =not applicable J =Implemented using Java 
P = tmplemen#ed using Pert 
D =Implemented on desktops 
NS-2 =Implemented on network-
simulator2 
O =Implemented offline 
~~ 
APPENDIX B: Agent Code 
/* 
MAIDS: Multi-Agent Intrusion Detection System 
Test Scenario 1 Agent 
*/ 
package agent; 
import MAIDS.*; 
import java.util.*; 
,import java.lang.*; 
import java.io.*; 
class Table implements Serializable // Pre and Conseq tables 
{ 
int ID; 
String Ent; 
String Ent; 
String time; 
String EventName; 
} 
class SmallTable implements Serializable //the correlated table 
{ 
int id; 
int Cause; 
int Result; 
String Events; 
} 
class hostmachine implements Serializable 
{ 
String name; 
int visits; 
} 
//  Had to add this here for Serializability 
class RuleSet implements Serializable { 
** 
* PreArg and ConArg is the argument of prerequisite and consequence. 
* arg:-l-no_arg~,unent;0=one argument and that is DestIPAddress;l-two 
* arguments and Both are DestlPAddress; 2-two arguments and -one is 
* DestlPAddress and the other is SrcIPAddress 
*/ 
String EventName ; 
String Prerequisitel; 
String Prerequisite2; 
int PreArg; 
String Consequencel; 
String Consequence2; 
int ConArg; 
public RuleSet(String e, String p ,int pa, String c, int ca){ 
this.EventName=e; 
this.Prerequisitel=p; 
this,PreArg=pa; 
this.Consequencel=c; 
this.ConArg=ca; 
} 
public RuleSet(String e, String p1,String p2 ,int pa, String c, int ca}{ 
this.EventName=e; 
this.Prerequisitel=pl; 
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this.Prerequisite2=p2; 
this.PreArg=pa; 
this.Consequencel=c; 
this.ConArg=ca; 
} 
public RuleSet(String e, String p ,int pa, String c1, String c2,int ca){ 
this.EventName=e; 
this.Prerequisitel=p; 
this.PreArg=pa; 
this.Consequencel=cl; 
this.Consequence2=c2; 
this.ConArg=ca; 
public RuleSet(String e, String pl ,Suring p2,int pa, String c1,String c2,int ca){ 
this.EventName=e; 
this.Prerequisitel=pl; 
this.Prerequisite2=p2; 
this.PreArg=pa; 
this.Consequencel=cl; 
this.Consequence2=c2; 
this.ConArg=ca; 
} 
public boolean IsRule(String e) 
{ 
} 
i/ 
.. 
. return (EventName.compareTo(e)== 0); 
End class RuleSet 
class HyperAlert extends Alert implements Serializable 
String Prerequisitel ; 
String Prerequisite2 ; 
String Consequencel; 
String Consequence2; 
public HyperAlert(Alert a) 
{ 
} 
// 
/** 
super(a); 
{ 
* 
* r: rule' set 
* x :element of rule set 
*/ 
public void SetPrerequisite (RuieSet r[],int x) 
if (r[x].PreArg==-1)/*no argument*/ 
Prerequisitel = r[x].Prerequisitel; 
else. if {r[x].PreArg==O) 
I*one prerequisite argument and that is DestIPAddress*/ 
Prerequisitel = r[x].Prerequisitel +"("+ DestIPAddress +")"; 
else if (r[x].PreArg==1){ 
/*two prerequisite argument and both 
Prerequisitel = r[x].Prerequisitel +" 
Prerequisite2 = r[x].Prerequisite2 +" 
} 
else{ 
DestIPAddress*/ 
{"+ DestIPAddress +")"; 
("+ DestIPAddress +")"; 
/*two prerequisite argument and one is DestIPAddress and the other is SrcIPAddress*/ 
43 
Prerequisitel = r[x].Prerequisitel +" 
Prerequisite2 = r[x].Prerequisite2 +" 
I/ 
/** 
* 
* r :rule set 
* x :element of rule set 
*/ 
"+ DestlPAddress +")"; 
"+ SrcIFAddress +")"; 
public void SetConsequence {Ruleset r[],int x) 
} 
I/ 
if {r[x].ConArg==-1)I*no argument*I 
Consequencel = r[x].Consequencel; 
else if {r[x].ConArg==O) 
I*one Consequence argument and that is DestlPAddress*I 
Consequencel = r[x].Consequencel +"("+ DestlPAddress +")"; 
else if {r[x] .ConArg==1) { 
/*two consequence argument and both DestlPAddress*/ 
Consequencel = r[x].Consequencel +"("+ DestlPAddress +")"; 
Consequence2 = r[x].Consequence2 +"("+DestlPAddress +")"; 
} 
else { 
/*two consequence argument and one is DestlPAddress and the other is 
SrcIPAddress*/ 
Consequencel = r[x].Consequencel +"("+ DestlPAddress +")"; 
Consequence2 = r[x].Consequence2 +"("+ SrcIPAddress +")"; 
} 
} 
End class HyperAlert 
public class Testl extends MobileTransition implements Serializable 
{ 
// 
public int seq, caught = 0; 
public Table [] ConsegSet = new Table[1000]; 
public Table [] PreregSet = new Table[1000]; 
public SmallTable CorrelatedAlert[] = new SmaliTable[1000]; 
private hostmachine []- Targets = new hostmachine[10]; 
public int ConsegPtr = 0; 
public int PreregPtr = 0; 
public int CorrelatedPtr = 0; 
public int targetCount = 0; 
public Ruleset [] Rule; 
/* These are the attack ,events that we know 
about and can detect. 
*/ 
public void MyRulesO 
{ 
} 
I/ 
Rule = new RuleSet[5]; 
Rule[0]= new Ruleset{"Sadmind Ping","OSSolaris",0,"VulnerableSadmind",0); 
Rule[1]= new Ruleset{"Sadmind Amslverify_Overflow","VulnerableSadmind", 
"OSSolaris",l,"GainAccess",0); 
Rule[2]= new Ruleset{"Rsh","GainAccess","GainAccess",2,"SystemCompromised", 
"SystemCompromised",2); 
Rule[3]= new Ruleset{"MstreamZombie","SystemCompromised","SystemCompromised", 
2,"ReadyToLaunchDDOSAttack",-1); 
Rule[4]= new Ruleset{"Stream DoS","ReadyToLaunchDDOSAttack",-1,"DDOSAgainst",0); 
/* This function fills the Consequence and 
Prerequisite tables with the valid Hyperalerts. 
*I 
public void InsertTables{HyperAlert ha) 
{ 
/!insert one item into Consequence table 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr] = new Table(); 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr].ID = ha.EventID; 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr].En1 = ha.Consequencel; 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr].En2 = ha.Consequence2; 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr].time = ha.EventDate; 
ConsegSet[ConsegPtr].EventName = ha.OrigEventName; 
ConsegPtr++; 
//insert one item into Prereq table 
PreregSet[PreregPtr] = new TableO; 
PreregSet[PreregPtr].ID = ha.EventlD; 
PreregSet[PreregPtr].En1 = ha.Prerequisitel; 
PreregSet[PreregPtr].En2 = ha.Prerequisite2; 
PreregSet[PreregPtr].time = ha.EventDate; 
PreregSet[PreregPtr].EventName = ha.DrigEventName; 
PreregPtr++; 
} 
// 
/* The CorrTable keeps track of events which have 
been correlated. This is later used to inform the 
administrator of an .attack sequence. 
*/ 
public void InsertCorrTable(int x, int y) 
{ 
} 
// 
CorrelatedAlert[CorrelatedPtr] 
CorrelatedAlert[CorrelatedPtr] 
CorrelatedAlert[CorrelatedPtr] 
CorrelatedAlert[CorrelatedPtr] 
CorrelatedAlert[CorrelatedPtr] 
Integer.toString(y); 
= new SmallTable{); 
.id = CorrelatedPtr + 1; 
.Cause = x; 
.Result = y; 
.Events = Integer.toString(x 
//look for matches with events already in the table 
for{int i = 0; i < CorrelatedPtr; i++) 
{ 
+ " -> " + 
if( CorrelatedAlert[i].Events.substring(0,4).equals{Integer.toString(y)) ) 
{ //add new event to beginning of [i].event 
CorrelatedAlert[i].Events = Integer.toString(x) + -> + 
CorrelatedAlert[i].Events; 
}. 
else 
{ 
if{ CorrelatedAlert[i].Events.endsWith(Integer.toString(x)) ) 
t //add y to end 
CorrelatedAlert[i].Events = CorrelatedAlert[i].Events + -> " 
+ Integer.toString{y); 
} 
} 
} 
CorrelatedPtr++; 
1* This function prints the tables that were filled with 
events as the agent read in the raw data from files. 
*/ 
public void PrintTables{) 
{ 
//set up file output stream here. 
String outdataPath = "C:/IVoyager3-2I/MAIDS//correlation//ConsegSet.txt"; 
String outdataPath2 = "C://Voyager3-2//MAIDS//correlation//PreregSet.txt"; 
DataOutputStream dos = null; 
try { 
File f = new Fiie{outdataPath); 
FileOutputStream fos = new FileDutputStream{f); 
~~ 
BufferedOutputStream bos = new BufferedOutputStream(fos); 
dos = new DataOutputStream{bos); 
for(int x = 0; x < ConsegPtr; x++) 
{ 
dos.writeBytes{ConsegSet[x].ID + "," + ConsegSet[x].Enl + " + 
ConsegSet[x]_En2 + "," + ConsegSet[x].time + "," + 
ConsegSet[x].EventName + "\n"); 
} 
dos .flush {) ; 
dos.close(); 
} 
catch (Exception c ) { } 
try { 
File f = new File(outdataPath2); 
FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(f); 
BufferedOutputStream bos = new BufferedOutputStream{fos}; 
dos = new DataOutputStream{bos); 
for(int x = 0; x < PreregPtr; x++) 
{ 
dos.writeBytes(PreregSet[x].ID + "," + PreregSet[x].En1 + " " + 
PreregSet[x].En2 + "," + PreregSet[x].time + "," + 
PreregSet[x].EventName + "\n"); 
} 
dos .flush () ; 
dos.close{}; 
} 
catch(Exception d) {} 
} I/PrintTables 
l/ 
/* This function prints the correlated events to file*/ 
public void PrintCorrTable() 
{ 
/Iset up file output stream here. 
String outdataPath = "C://Voyager3-2//MAIDS//correlation//RyanResults.txt"; 
DataOutputStream dos = null; 
try { 
File f = new File(outdataPath); 
FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream{f); 
BufferedOutputStream bos = new BufferedOutputStream(fos); 
dos = new DataOutputStream(bos); 
for(int i = 0; i < CorrelatedPtr; i++) 
{ //look up event id and print the event 'name' 
dos.writeBytes(CorrelatedAlert[i].Events); 
dos.writeBytes("\n"); 
} 
dos.flush(); 
dos close(); 
catch(Exception e) {} 
} 
// 
/* This function adds the host to a list of hosts known by the agent and 
records how many times the agent has been to that host 
*/ 
public int setTargetO 
{ 
String tempName = myHost.hostO; 
if(targetCount == 0) 
{ 
//add new element to array 
Targets[targetCount] = new hostmachine{); 
Targets[targetCount].name = tempName; 
Targets[targetCount].visits = 1; 
targetCount++; 
} 
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else 
{ 
for{int i = 0; i < targetCount; i++) 
{ 
//look for item; if found, increase visits 
if( Targetsji].name.equals{tempName) ) 
{ 
Targetsji].visits++; 
targetCount++; 
return {Targetsji].visits); 
} 
} 
//name not found; let's add it in 
TargetsjtargetCount] = new hostmachine{); 
TargetsjtargetCount].name = tempName; 
TargetsjtargetCount].visits = 1; 
targetCount++; 
} 
return (1); 
} 
// 
public String agentName() 
{ 
return "TEST1"; 
} 
// 
public Stringj] sources{) 
{ 
Stringj] r = {"*Test"}; 
return r; 
} 
// 
public String whichAgent() 
String r = "Test1"; 
return r; 
} 
//  Main Event Correlation Function 
public void check4intrusions() 
{ 
String input = null; 
String dataPath; 
String tempDate; 
String tempSrcIP; 
String tempDestIP; 
String tempOrigEventName; 
int commal = 0; 
int comma2 = 0; 
int statusl, status2 = 0; 
int templD, tempSrcPort, tempDestPort; 
int beenHere = setTarget(); 
if{beenHere < 2) /lonly read data file once per host for test scenario 1 (off-line). 
MyRules(); 
DataInputStream dis = null; 
if {System.getProperty("os.name").startsWith("Windows")) 
dataPath = "C://Voyager3-2//MAIDS//correlation//abbrevents2 windows.txt"; 
else 
{ 
if(System.getProperty("os.name").startsWith("Linux")) 
dataPath = "//homel/root//abbrevents2.txt"; 
else 
dataPath = "C://Voyager3-2//MAIDS//correlation//abbrevents2.txt"; 
} 
try { 
File f = new File{dataPath); 
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(f); 
BufferedlnputStream bis = new BufferedInputStream{fis); 
~/ 
dis = new DataInputStream(bis); 
input = dis.readLine(); //get past header row 
while{ (input = dis.readLineO) != null ) { 
/Iget first field 
commal = input.indexOf(','); 
tempID = Integer.parseInt( input.substring(0, commal) ); 
/Iget second field 
commal = commal ; 
commal = input.indexOf(',', commal + 1); 
tempDate = input.substring(conm~al + 1, commal); 
/Iget third field 
commal = commal; 
commal = input . indexCf (' , ' , commal+l) ; 
tempSrcPort = Integer.parselnt( input.substring(commal + 1, 
commal) .) ; 
//get fourth field 
commal = commal ; 
commal = input . indexOf (' , ' , commal+l) ; 
tempSrcIP = input.substring(commal + 1, commal); 
/ /get fifth field 
commal = commal ; 
commal = input.indexOf(',', commal+l); 
tempDestPort = Integer.parseInt( input.substring(commal + 1, 
commal ) ) ; 
//get sixth field 
commal = commal; 
commal = input.indexOf(',', commal+l); 
tempDestIP = input.substring(commal + 1, commal); 
//get seventh field 
tempOrigEventName = input.substring(com~na2 + 1); 
/I 
try{ 
compare to rules(5) now 
for ( int x = 0 ; x < 5 ; x++ ) 
{ 
if(Rule[x].IsRule(tempOrigEventName)) 
{ 
} 
}//end for 
Alert a = new Alert( 
tempID, 
tempDate, 
tempSrcPort, 
tempSrclP, 
tempDestPort, 
tempDestIP, 
tempOrigEventName); 
HyperAlert ha = new HyperAlert(a); 
ha.SetConsequence(Rule,x); 
ha.SetPrerequisite(Rule,x); 
1/insert ha into table; 
InsertTables(ha); 
break; 
}//end try 
catch(Exception e) { 
System.out.println("Exception thrown in Rules: + e); 
} 
}/lend while 
}I/end try 
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//  Con & Pre tables filled now 
catch(IOException e} { 
System.out.println{"File read error "+e.getMessage{)); 
} 
finally { 
//close the file 
if ( dis ! = null ) { 
try { 
dis.closeO; 
} 
catch (IOException ioe) { 
} 
} 
} 
}//end if been here 
//  All data now read in from data source tables 
//  Do correlation now on 2~ windows host visit 
if( {beenHere > 1) &~ {beenHere < 3) && 
(System.getProperty{"os.name").startsWith("Windows"}) ) 
{ 
for(int x = 0; x < ConsegPtr; x++) 
t 
for(int y = 0; y < PreregPtr; y++) 
{ 
try{ 
if ( 
(( !(PreregSet[y].Enl.equals{"null")) && 
( (PreregSet[y].Enl.equals(ConsegSet[x].En1)) ~ ) 
(PreregSet[y].Enl.equals(ConsegSet[x].En2))))) i ~ 
(( !(PreregSet[y].En2.equals("null")) && 
{{{PreregSet[y].Ent).equals(ConsegSet[x].En2)} ~ ~ 
((PreregSet[y].Ent).equals(ConsegSet[x].En1))))) 
{ 
/!select x & y's id's and insert into CorrTable(); 
InsertCorrTable(ConsegSet[x].ID 
,PreregSet[y].ID); 
} 
}//try 
catch {Exception e ) { } 
}//end for y 
} II end .for x 
System.out.println{"Total correlations = " + CorrelatedPtr); 
PrintCorrTable{); 
PrintTables(); 
}//end correlation 
}//end check4intrusions 
// 
public void setCaught(int number) { 
caught = number; 
} 
public int getCaught{) { 
return caught; 
} 
// 
public String[] tokenSpecO 
{ 
String[] r = {"FTP_PORT","FTP_PORT OK"}; 
return r; 
} 
/I 
public Token [ ] unify ( Token [ ] in ) 
{ 
System.err.println{"T1 starting unify{) with:"); 
System.err.println{"sequence numbers "+in[0].sequenceO+" and"); 
System.err.println{in[1].sequenceO+". "); 
i f (in [ 1 ] .sequence ( ) _= in [ 0 ] .sequence () +1) 
{ 
~7 
} 
/I 
Tokenf] out = new Token[1]; 
out[0] = new Token(-"col 1", 
return out; 
else 
{ 
"", "place 1",in[1].sequence(), in); 
return null; 
} IlToken[] test = new Token[1]; return test; 
} !lend class Test1 
so 
APPENDIX C: Mobile Transition 
/* 
MAIDS: Multi-Agent Intrusion Detection System 
Iowa State University 
MobileTransition: 
Abstract superclass of ail mobile transition agents. 
*~ 
package MAIDS; 
import java.util.*; 
import com.objectspace.voyager.*; 
import com.objectspace.voyager.agent.*; 
abstract public class MobileTransition extends Transition 
{ 
public abstract String whichAgent(); 
public abstract void check4intrusionsO; 
public abstract int getCaught(); 
public abstract void setCaught(int foo); 
/* Inform the agent of a new host it must visit. If list is 
* empty when this call is made, the host will be considered 
* the agent's garage, where no activity takes place. 
*! 
public void addHost( VoyagerHost h ) 
{ 
synchronized( theHosts ) 
{ 
theHosts.addElement{h.label()); 
report{); 
} 
}// End Method addHostO 
public void run( VoyagerHost h ) 
{ 
go( h ); 
}// End Method runO 
// Inform the agent of a host it no longer should visit. 
public void delHost( VoyagerHost h ) 
{ 
synchronized( theHosts ) 
{ 
theHosts.removeElement(h.label()); 
report(); 
} 
}// End Method delHost() 
I* Start the transition operating. 
* s: nameserver string, from console 
* src: Vector containing labels for all source places 
*/ 
public void go( VoyagerHost h ) 
{ 
nameserver = new VoyagerHost{h); 
running = true; 
my () ; 
}// End Method go() 
// The callback function used in for Voyager's moveTo method. 
public void mainloopO 
Boolean looping = true; 
~~ 
while{ looping ) 
{ 
if( running ) 
check4intrusions{); 
work(); 
} 
else 
{ 
// Garbage collect me! 
Agent.of(this).setAutonomous{false); 
return; 
} 
pause (1000+ (int) (Math. random() *1000)) ; 
if{ my{) ) 
{ 
looping = false; 
} 
} 
}// End Method mainloop() 
public void parkloop() 
{ 
Boolean looping = true; 
while( looping ) 
{ 
System.err.println{agentName()+": parked"); 
while{ theHosts.size{) == 0 && running ) 
{ 
try {Thread.sleep{1000);} catch{Exception e) 
{ 
} 
} 
if( running ) 
.{ 
/I a host is ready to be visited. 
looping = ! my{); 
} 
else 
{ 
// we've been shut down. 
Agent . of {this) . setAutonomous ( false) ; 
return; 
} 
}// End Method parkloop() 
protected void park() 
{ 
try 
{ 
hostIndex = -1; 
Agent.of(this).moveTo{Agent.of{this).getHome{), "parkloop"); 
} 
catch{ Exception e ) 
{ 
e.printStackTrace(); 
} 
}// End Method park() 
/* Move to the next host. 
* return true iff the move was successful 
* 
protected Boolean my{) 
{ 
int numhosts; 
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synchronized( theHosts } 
{ 
numhosts = theHosts size{); 
if ( numhosts == 0 ) 
{ 
if( hostIndex >= 0 } 
park {) ; 
else 
return false; !/ failure 
} 
else 
{ 
hostIndex++; 
if( hostIndex >= numhosts ) 
hostIndex = 0; 
myHost = new VoyagerHost({String)theHosts.elementAt{hostIndex)}; 
System.out.println("moving to host "+ theHosts.elementAt(hostlndex) + 
"\n"); 
try 
{ 
Agent.of{this).moveTo {myHost.dest(}, "mainloop"}; 
} 
catch{ Exception e ) 
{ 
System.err.println("Mobility exception: "+e ); 
return false; 
} 
}// 
return true; 
} /I end of if there are hosts 
} II end of sync block (theHosts) 
return true; /I actually, can't get here 
 End Method mv() 
protected void report() 
{ 
}// 
System.err.println("hosts for this agent:"); 
for( int i =0; i < theHosts.size{); i++ ) 
System.err.println(theHosts.elementAt(i)); 
 End Method reportO 
private Vector theHosts = new Vector{); 
private int hostIndex = 0 // forces agent to be explicitly parked 
private boolean ready = false; 
}// End Class MobileTransition.java 
